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corrosive effects of socio-economic modemization combined to a large extent with
ideocratic communism, but as an imposed secularism it was only partially able to destroy
traditional religious communities; hence the conspicious contemporary religious revival.
Also in the industrial latecomers in Latin America secularization has been relatively weak,
due to less cohesive Catholic monopoly, the development of social Catholicism and the dy-
namics of Protestant denominationalism. In sum, secularization is not a general conse-
quence of industrialization, its timing and form; rather it depends on the religious activities
and instiution-building in the context of socio-economic modemization.
V. Concluswn
This tour de force through Martin's theory of secularization could do no more than give
some hints to its systematic structure and some suggestions for critical reconsideration. My
hope is that this may serve as a methodological basis for more systematic historical-
sociological comparative research on the complex configurations of religious change and
secularization in the modern world.
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3. Kommentar zu Willfried Spohn
Monika Wohlrab-Sahr
The recent debate on the concept of secularization, as raised by American and Anglo-Saxon
sociologists and social historians - some of whom even claimed a paradigm shift in the
sociology of religion (Warner 1993) - is not at all a new debate. This is shown best by the
work of David Martin (1969) who, in his 1969 book - »The Religious and the Secular« -
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called for an elimination of the concept of secularization altogether. »There is no unitary
process called >secularization<«, he claimed, »arising in reaction to a set of characteristics
labelled >religious<«. And he continued: »It can be shown that religious institutions bear no
such common characteristics« (Martin 1969: 16). What Martin referred to at that time was
mainly the ideology of secularism, in its manifestations of rationalism, Marxism, and exi-
stentialism. In his view these attempts to formulate »master trends« were rooted in ideologi¬
cal views of history, all of which he feit suffered from the poverty of historicism (Martin
1969: 2). Nine years after his original proposal to eliminate the concept of secularization,
Martin (1978) published his own »general theory of secularization«, in which he (first) cri-
tiqued pre-existing secularization theory and (second) developed a new theory which at-
tempted to avoid reproducing the theoretical difficulties of »master trend theories". In order
to do this he took into account the variety of circumstances (religious configurations, geo-
political frame conditions, and socio-economic contexts) under which secularization took
place. Willfried Spohn has praised Martin's attempt, but he has also added further differen-
tiations to it.
However, I do not want to discuss the socio-historical details raised by David Martin and
Willfried Spohn. I would rather try - Coming from the readings of both - to raise some que¬
stions and develop some thoughts that seem important for the evaluation ofthe recent attack
on secularization theories.
To my mind the central question is: What are we talking about when we are talking
about secularization? Willfried Spohn's paper does not define explicitly what is meant by
secularization, but it does suggest that it is something that can be measured in terms of its
degree.
I would like to differentiate four analytical levels:
1. Is what we are talking about the »secularism« as manifested in the theories that David
Martin opposed in his former work? One could consider these theories themselves as
manifestations ofthe process of secularization, and not just as anti-religious ideologies. I
would call this first level the level ofculture.
2. Or are we talking about the decline of individual religious engagement (like membership
in religious organizations, going to church, participation in rituals, spending money for
religious institutions, or praying)? These are the most readily measurable indicators, and
are often referred to when scholars talk about secularization. And it seems to be the ea-
siest indicator, if one tries to distinguish certain levels of secularization (as David Martin
and Willfried Spohn do). I call this second level the individual level.
3. Or are we talking about religious institutions? For example about the number, education,
and social position of their Professionals and about the impact of these institutions on dif¬
ferent levels of society. I call this the intitutional level.
4. This leads to my last point, which seems to be the most important in the context of a
theory of secularization. To talk about a general trend of secularization always implied
the declining significance of religion for the Operation of the social system. I would say
that the attempt to reject secularization theories also has to show that this is a wrong as¬
sumption. Here I would like to quote a polemic Statement of Bryan Wilson: »Do the
churches influence big business? Do business corporations regularly consult the will of
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God in planning their commercial strategies or in determining the appropriate levels of
profit to be sought? Is trade-union policy forged only after prayerful religious counse-
ling? Are we to assume that the moral fibre ofthe Nixon, Reagan, and Bush administra¬
tions was reinforced by the White House breakfasts with Billy Graham or the televange-
lists? Does the British government consult the archbishop when devising social policy or
does a contemporary prime minister devote to episcopal affairs even a fraction of the ti¬
me which was the habit of prime ministers in the late nineteenth Century? Has »Humanae
Vitae« given pause to any government with respect to the availabiltty of birth control
appliances (Ireland, of course, always excepted)? Where is this continuing power - a
power which once could define secular laws in usury, regulate the conditions of pro¬
duction in the guilds, and prohibit what today are normal business and commercial
practices? Such was the power of religion in pre-industrial society, when monarchs were
brought cringing for forgiveness to religious shrines and matters of personal morality we¬
re effectively dictated by pontifical pronouncements. Where is such power >manifestly
apparent< today? «(Wilson 1992:199f). I call this the level ofthe social system.
By talking about a theory of secularization or by rejecting it one has to show, which of the¬
se different levels is referred to and how developments on these levels relate to each other.
But, especially, one has to show the reference to the level of the social system. It might be
possible, for example, that a society has a high level of individual religious activity, but in
which nevertheless religious institutions have lost institutional power and the power to in-
fluence the Operation ofthe social System.
In this vein, I will end with a remark on the comparison between the United States and
Germany, to which this Session was supposed to be a contribution.
Considering all these different levels, the United States would seem only in some re-
spects to be one ofthe Western world's least secular nations. Obviously, there is more indi¬
vidual activity going on in the United States than in Germany. On this level the United
States appears to be less secularized. One could add another point: In the United States reli-
giously motivated groups are obviously more publicly visible. But, the proposition that the¬
se kinds of religious groups and institutions actually influence the Operation of the social
system more than in other
- supposedly more secularized - countries like Germany seems
at least questionable to me. One could even raise the question: Is religion in the United Sta¬
tes not more restricted to the field of individual religiosity on the one side and to the label-
ling of identities of distinct ethnic groups on the other side than is the case in Germany
where significant linkages exist between religious institutions, the welfare State, and public
education? In this sense many Americans consider their nation to be much more secularized
than Germany.
My conclusion: Let's talk about what it is that we are talking about!
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4. Deregulating Religion: The Economies of Church and State
Laurence R. Iannaccone, Roger Finke and Rodney Stark
I. Introduction
Traditional religious research falls to recognize religion as a market phenomenon. It espe¬
cially overlooks supply-side factors that shape the incentives and opportunities of religious
firms, emphasizing instead demand-side shifts in the pereeptions, tastes, and needs of con-
sumers. This paper reviews the effects of government actions that alter religious supply - a
longer Version appears in Economic Inquiry 40(2), April 1997.
We find that simple deregulation lies at the root of numerous religious trends and events.
America's exceptionally high levels of church attendance and Sweden's exceptionally low
levels stem from the former country's competitive religious market and the latter country's
state-sponsored religious monopoly. Japan's post-war shift to a free religious market led to
an explosion of new religions. And the »cult phenomenon« ofthe 1960s and 70s had more
to do with changed U.S. immigration laws than a transformed Westem »consciousness.«
Thus, the history of religion is strongly influenced by the structure of religious markets, and
market forces continue to shape its future.
// Adam Smith 's critique ofestablished religion
Adam Smith (1965: 740-766) laid the foundation for an economies of religion more than
two hundred years ago. In a largely ignored chapter of The Wealth ofNation, Smith argued
that self-interest motivates clergy just as it does secular producers, that market forces con-
strain churches just as they do secular firms; and that the benefits of competition, the bur-
dens of monopoly, and the hazards of government regulation affect religion like any other
sector ofthe economy.
Several years ago, Iannaccone (1991) attempted a simple test of Smith's assertions using
contemporary data from 17 developed, Westem countries. Although the available data were
relatively crade, Smith's predictions carry the day. Among Protestants, at least, church at¬
tendance and religious belief both are higher in countries with numerous competing
churches than in countries dominated by a single monopoly church. The pattern is statisti-
cally significant and visually striking. Church attendance rates, frequency of prayer, belief
in God, and virtually every other measure of piety are higher in countries with greater levels
